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RESETTING THE FOUNDATIONS:
RENEWING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
UNDER SECTION 2(B) OF THE CHARTER
Jamie Cameron*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 40th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on April
17, 2022 is a time for reckoning, and an opportunity to ready s. 2’s fundamental
freedoms for the future.1 Today, as ever, freedom is under perennial challenge from
the collective instinct to suppress voices and views that threaten to upset the status
quo. The fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, peaceful assembly, and
association are subject to the benevolence of the dominant will, and to any
constraints the Charter’s system of constitutional rights might place on that will.2
Whether and to what degree a democratic community accepts freedom of difference,
including differences that may be volatile and even destabilizing, is an age-old
question. That much is familiar.
This discussion on the freedom to differ and dissent focuses on s. 2(b)’s guarantee
of expressive freedom. If s. 2(b)’s fortunes in the Charter’s formative period were
mixed, two catalysts propel a re-set of the guarantee’s foundations at this time. First
is a backdrop of rising concern and pushback against the perceived excesses of
expressive freedom, and a sensibility, in some discourse, that free expression is a
*

Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank the co-chairs of
the Forgotten Foundations Workshop, Brian Bird and Derek Ross, for inviting me to
participate in the Workshop, and also for providing valuable comments and editorial
assistance on earlier drafts of my paper. I also thank Hoi Kong for commenting on the
Workshop draft and engaging with me in discussion at the symposium. Finally, I am grateful
to Matthew Traister (J.D. 2023) for his valuable research, especially on the “legacy”
jurisprudence, discussed below at II, 1. “Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under
s. 2(b)”
1

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.11 (hereinafter “the Charter”).
2

Note that s. 33 of the Charter grants legislatures the power to override certain Charter
rights and freedoms, namely ss. 2 and 7 to 15 for a period of ﬁve years. In recent years the
override has been invoked in controversial circumstances in Quebec, Saskatchewan, and
Ontario. See, e.g., Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of the State, 1st Sess., 42nd Leg.,
Quebec, 2019 (S.Q. 2019, c. 12) and An Act respecting French, the offıcial and common
language of Quebec, 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Quebec, 2021) (Quebec); The School Protection
Act, S.S. 2018, c. 39 (Saskatchewan); and Bill 307, The Protecting Elections and Defending
Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (Ontario).
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throwback value, laissez-faire and regressive in nature.3 To some extent, that views
ﬁnds expression in a regulatory impetus that aims primarily, though not exclusively,
at online communications.4
Technology has shifted and escalated debate about the boundaries of expressive
freedom, and while the regulatory thrust varies in its details, controlling a ﬂood of
unfathomable online content is the overarching goal. Regulating technology adds a
layer of complication, but does not alter the unrelenting goal of eliminating
objectionable content. While the abuse of freedom must be countered, expressive
content is too often restricted through clumsy and overbroad measures that rest on
an expansive and amorphous concept of harm. In conceptual terms, it is troubling
that limits on expression may not be presented as exceptions to a presumption in
freedom’s favour. Too often, suppression is grounded in righteous conviction that
prohibiting content that offends and even hurts is unarguable.
A second imperative arising from this synergy concerns s. 2(b)’s doctrinal ediﬁce
and its lack of fortitude to withstand the pressures of the day. To be fair, some
branches of s. 2(b) jurisprudence, such as the open court doctrine, are for the most
part exemplary.5 Moreover, and despite refusing to grant it constitutional recogni3

In the United States, see, e.g., G. Lakier, “The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom
of Speech” (2021) 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2299 (explaining how the “non First-Amendment”
system of speech laws exemplify a majoritarian free speech tradition and modify the “laissez
faire” constitutionalism of the First Amendment); T. Wu, “Is the First Amendment
Obsolete?” (2018) 117 Mich. L. Rev. 547 (explaining that many of the core assumptions of
the First Amendment no longer hold true); P.E. Moskowitz, The Case Against Free Speech:
The First Amendment, Fascism and the Future of Dissent (New York: Hachette Book Group,
2019) (maintaining that freedom of speech has never existed and is empty, hollow, and
meaningless). In Canada, see, e.g., R. Moon, “Does Freedom of Expression Have a Future”?
in E. Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas of Free Expression (Toronto: Uuniversity of Toronto Press,
2021), at 15-34.
4

See, e.g., Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, House of
Commons, Taking Action to End Online Hate (June 2019, 42nd Parl.), online: <https://www.
ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Reports/RP10581008/justrp29/justrp29-e.
pdf>;
 Final Report, Canadian Commission on Democratic Expression, “Harms Reduction: A
Six-Step Program to Protect Democratic Expression Online (January 2021) (“A Six-Step
Program”), online: <https://ppforum.ca/articles/harms-reduction-a-six-step-program-to-protectdemocratic-expression-online/>;
 Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the
Canadian Human Rights Act (hate propaganda, hate crimes and hate speech), (1st Reading,
June 23, 2021), online: <https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-36/ﬁrst-reading>

5
See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.) (statutory publication ban); Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) (judicial publication ban); Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3
S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) (closed courtrooms); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3
S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.); and R. v. O.N.E., [2001] S.C.J. No. 74, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 (S.C.C.)
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tion, the Court’s jurisprudence acknowledges the distinctive role the press and
media play in a functioning democracy.6 But when content is at issue, s. 2(b) is
notably less resilient.
As explained elsewhere in more detail, the current framework of s. 2(b)
methodology is unsound and unprincipled.7 Fault lines that are embedded in the
jurisprudence register at both stages of the analysis, under the guarantee’s standard
of breach, as well as under the justiﬁcation of limits under s. 1. These fault lines
arise principally from the Court’s landmark decisions in Ford v. Quebec and Irwin
Toy v. Quebec, and from adoption of the contextual approach under s. 1.8 The
consequences for the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom are profound, and
appear under each branch of the analysis.
(judicial publication bans); Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332
(S.C.C.) (closed hearing); Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) (access to search warrants). See J.
Cameron, “A Reﬂection on Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 163, at 184-90 (praising the open justice jurisprudence as a “section 2(b) template”).
6

See R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 374 (S.C.C.)
(concluding that it was neither desirable nor necessary to address the constitutional status of
the press under s. 2(b)). But see Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J.
No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.); R. v. O.N.E., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478
(S.C.C.); Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.); Toronto Star
Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188
(S.C.C.) (providing exemplary analysis of the vital links between a free press, the open court
principle, democratic self government, and the accountability of the courts and justice
system); see also R v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 374
(S.C.C.) (per Abella J., concurring and endorsing an independent guarantee for the press and
media). See, generally, J. Cameron, “Section 2(b)’s Other Fundamental Freedom: The Press
Guarantee, 1982-2012”, in L. Taylor and C-M. O’Hagan, eds., The Unfulﬁlled Promise of
Press Freedom in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017); B. Oliphant, “Does
Independent Protection for Freedom of the Press Make a Difference?: The Case of Vice Media
v. Canada (Attorney General)”, in B. Bird, D. Newman & D. Ross, eds., The Forgotten
Fundamental Freedoms of the Charter, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2020).
7

J. Cameron, “Big M’s Forgotten Legacy of Freedom”, in B. Bird, D. Newman & D.
Ross, eds., The Forgotten Fundamental Freedoms of the Charter, (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2020). at 17-62 (critiquing the s. 2(b) jurisprudence); J. Cameron, “A Reﬂection on
Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163, at 167-73
(criticizing s. 2(b) methodology).
8

Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.);
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.). The contextual approach was derived from Wilson J.’s concurring opinion in
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1326 (S.C.C.), 5; see discussion below at III “Resetting the Foundations, Part 2: Section 1,
The Contextual Approach, and a Conception of Justiﬁcation”.
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Critically, the current methodology marginalizes the concept of breach in
signiﬁcant ways. First, s. 2(b) lacks a conception of freedom to ground the
entitlement and inform the analysis of breach. Forty years on, the jurisprudence has
yet to offer a theory of freedom that safeguards the voices of difference and dissent.
This is a serious deﬁciency that must be corrected to meet s. 2(b)’s unerring
challenge – of explaining why the Charter protects all views, including the
ideologically and morally offensive. Precisely because it engages our strongest
emotions and challenges deep-seated instincts, it is no small feat to show why
expressive content that ﬂouts or unsettles conventional values should be protected
by the Charter.
Second, an abstract theory or conception cannot protect freedom on its own, and
must be accompanied by a framework of principle to address transgressions of s.
2(b). Before any question of justiﬁcation arises under s. 1, the analysis of breach
requires a deep examination of the Charter violation and its consequences for
expressive freedom. Regrettably, that is not how current doctrine operates. In most
instances, the s. 2(b) analysis is perfunctory and discussion of the infringement is
thin at best, and often non-existent. Meanwhile, the analysis of reasonable limits
under s. 1 of the Charter is detailed and thorough. The lack of balance in this
doctrinal scheme necessarily privileges limits at the expense of s. 2(b)’s guarantee
of freedom.9
The deﬁcits on the s. 2(b) side of the Charter’s equation of rights and limits are
mirrored under s. 1. There, the central problem is the contextual approach and its
unrequited use of s. 2(b)’s underlying values to discount expressive content and
relax the standard of justiﬁcation.10 Under that approach, limits do not rest on
sufficient evidence of harm but rather, on pronouncements about the relative value
of expressive content. In principle, it is critical to reject the view that expression can
be limited simply because it lacks value. As explained below, protection for s. 2(b)’s
guarantee of expressive freedom requires a retreat from the contextual approach and
return to a more disciplined standard of justiﬁcation under Oakes.11
In spite of the criticisms it attracted, s. 2(b)’s analytical framework has been
relatively static since Irwin Toy was decided more than thirty years ago.12 While
other guarantees have been re-worked and even re-invented, expressive freedom has
9

See discussion below at II, 1. “Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under
s. 2(b)”.
10

See discussion below at II, 1. “Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under
s. 2(b)”.
11
See discussion below at II, 1. “Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under
s. 2(b)”.
12
See, e.g., R. Elliott, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy Framework for
Freedom of Expression”, (2011), 15 Rev. of Const. Studies 205; C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy:
A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under the Charter”, (2012), 17 Appeal: Current
Law and Law Reform 21 (proposing alternative approaches to s. 2(b)).

124

RESETTING THE FOUNDATIONS

experienced little conceptual growth.13 The Charter’s 40th anniversary offers a
moment to pause and invest in s. 2(b)’s renewal.
A process of renewal can place s. 2(b) on principled foundations and constrain the
power of regulators and legislators to infringe the Charter’s guarantee of expressive
freedom. This proposal addresses s. 2(b) and s. 1, engaging the concepts of breach
and justiﬁcation in a process of holistic reform. Under s. 2(b), it offers a theory of
freedom and suggests how to reform the current standard of breach before turning
to s. 1. There, the methodology requires the elimination of the contextual approach
and a re-invigoration of the Oakes test.
This ambitious task begins with a review of the deﬁciencies of s. 2(b)’s current
foundations, before introducing and explaining the building blocks of the proposal.
What emerges from a remake of s. 2(b) doctrine is a richer conception of entitlement
that deepens the analysis of breach and treats violations of expressive freedom with
the gravitas that is required by the Charter’s guarantee of fundamental freedoms.
Under s. 1, the methodology in s. 2(b) cases abandons the contextual approach,
restores the mandate of evidence-based decision-making, and boosts the role of
proportionality balancing to ensure that the interests at stake are fairly weighed
before limits on expressive freedom are justiﬁed.
A process of renewal that is complex in its re-ordering of current doctrine rests on
fundamental principles of rights protection. These principles support a proposal to
reshape s. 2(b)’s foundations and outline a robust methodology for the future.
Protecting freedom of expression depends on a culture of respect for rights and a
constitutional system of rights protection. Ideally, these dynamics can work in
tandem to bolster the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom. At this moment,
neither is especially reliable. Resetting s. 2(b)’s foundations can strengthen the
Charter’s role in protecting expressive freedom and inspire respect for freedom in
the broader democratic culture.
II. RESETTING THE FOUNDATIONS, PART 1:
CONCEPT OF BREACH

THE

PRINCIPLE

OF

FREEDOM AND

1. Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under s. 2(b)
Neither of the Supreme Court’s s. 2(b)’s landmarks inspired a culture of respect
for expressive freedom: while Irwin Toy upheld restrictions on advertising aimed at
children, Ford’s invalidation of Quebec’s outdoor signage law marked a pyrrhic
victory for expressive freedom when the province re-enacted the legislation and
relied on the override.14 Comparisons to other branches of s. 2 jurisprudence are
13
See below at II, 1. “Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under s. 2(b)” (noting
the renewal and re-invention of s. 2(d) and its guarantee of associational freedom).
14
Ford v. Quebec; Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.). In provoking the Government of Quebec to use the override, Ford had
spillover consequences for national unity and the Meech Lake Accord. J. Cameron, “To the
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revealing. Prior to Ford and Irwin Toy, R. v. Big M Drug Mart spoke powerfully of
freedom from religious persecution and of freedom as the absence of coercion or
constraint.15 And though defeatist at ﬁrst, the s. 2(d) jurisprudence provided
extensive discussion of associational freedom in the Alberta Reference, in McIntyre
J.’s concurrence and in Dickson C.J.C.’s much revered dissent.16 That dissent
provided the foundation for s. 2(d)’s renewal many years later.17
In many ways, Ford’s invalidation of Quebec’s language law was monumental.
Quebec’s immediate turn to the override conﬁrmed the risks the Court took in
applying a rigorous standard of justiﬁcation and invalidating legislation of utmost
sensitivity to Quebeckers. Section 2(b)’s interpretation was also at stake. At the time,
it was an open question whether the guarantee should be restricted in scope to
“political” expression. The Court rejected that approach, declaring that a “great
range of expression” is deserving of constitutional protection and concluding that
there is “no sound basis” for excluding commercial expression from the Charter.18
Ford held that s. 2(b) extends to more than the content of expression, includes
choice of language in outdoor commercial advertising, and protects the rights of
listeners as well as speakers.19 On compelled expression and the requirement to
advertise only in French, the Court cited Big M, stating that one of the Charter’s
Rescue: Antonio Lamer and the Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec” in Adam Dodek & Daniel
Jutras, eds., The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada,
2009) 237, at 243-48 (explaining the link between Quebec’s “visage linguistique”, the
override, and the Meech Lake Accord).
15

R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.)
(stating that freedom can “primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or
constraint”); see J. Cameron, “Big M’s Forgotten Legacy of Freedom” in B. Bird, D. Newman
& D. Ross, eds., The Forgotten Fundamental Freedoms of the Charter (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada Inc., 2020).
16
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.).
17

Freedom of association’s renewal began in 2001, when Dunmore v. Ontario endorsed
Dickson C.J.C.’s conception of association, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016
(S.C.C.). Section 2(d)’s progress continued with the overruling of s. 2(d)’s landmark
precedents – the “Labour Trilogy” – in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.);
Mounted Police Ass’n of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015]
1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J.
No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.).
18
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 764
and 767 (S.C.C.).
19

Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at
748-52 (S.C.C.), and stating, at 748, that there cannot be “true” freedom of expression by
means of language if one is prohibited from using the language of one’s choice.
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major purposes is to protect individuals from coercion or restraint by the state.20
Following the pattern of early decisions to ground the Charter’s rights and
freedoms in a foundation of principle, Ford introduced s. 2(b)’s underlying values
and since then, the “Ford values” have infused the jurisprudence.21 In Ford’s
iteration, those values encompass the truth-seeking and -attaining functions of
expression, its role in social and political decision making, and its connection to
diverse forms of individual self-fulﬁlment and human ﬂourishing.22
Ford’s articulation of abstract values signalled an inclusive and undifferentiated
scope of protection that embraced virtually all human endeavour. Little, if anything,
is excluded from a conception based, essentially, on the view that expression in any
of the Ford categories is valuable, at least in the abstract. Quite understandably, the
Court might have thought there was no need to theorize rationales that supported
broad and potentially unlimited protection for expressive freedom. But as one
commentator observed, Ford accepted “at face value the ‘generally’ held view that
these are the appropriate values to protect”, and then “stayed the course”, doing little
to deepen its conception of the values, or relate these values to a conception or
theory of freedom.23
That lack of reﬂection and development exposes a telling gap in insight – that the
Ford values do not present a theory or principle of freedom. Decision making, truth
seeking, and self-fulﬁlment accept or presume the value of those categories of
content, but make no mention of freedom. That gap in insight is critical because,
essentially without pause, the Ford values mapped onto assumptions about
expressive content that have deﬁned the s. 2(b) jurisprudence. Absent in those
assumptions is a recognition that making expressive freedom contingent on the
value of content negates s. 2(b)’s guarantee of freedom. While s. 2(b) has a
conception of expressive content that is guided by Ford’s abstract values, it lacks a
theory of expressive freedom. Still missing from s. 2(b) is an adequate account of
freedom and why expressive freedom should be rigorously protected by the Charter.
20

Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 751
and stating, at 748, that if a person is compelled by the state to a course of action or inaction
that otherwise would not be undertaken, that person is “not acting of his own volition and
cannot be said to be truly free”.
21
Albeit in obiter¸the Court ﬁrst canvassed the role of expressive freedom in Canada’s
political and constitutional tradition in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local
580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.).
22
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at
765-67 (S.C.C.); Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 927, at 976 (S.C.C.).
23
R. Elliot, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government,
Advancement of Truth, and Knowledge and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for
Protecting Freedom of Expression: Part I – Taking Stock” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R.(2d) 436, at
445.

127

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

Part of the problem is methodological and stems from Irwin Toy’s two-step test
of breach, which adopted a prima facie concept of breach that diluted and blurred
the role of Ford values under s. 2(b). Step one, which governs in the majority of
cases, grants prima facie protection to “every attempt to convey meaning”.24
Nothing further, including a discussion of Ford values or the severity of the breach,
is required; that threshold rests on an assumption of content neutrality and the
principle that content cannot be excluded without risking the disapproval and even
censorship of unpopular points of view.25 In this way and, perhaps inadvertently,
Irwin Toy diminished the Ford values because it enabled courts to make a summary
ﬁnding of breach and shift the analysis to s. 1.26 That approach lowered the
claimant’s burden under s. 2(b) but dispensed with the guarantee’s values,
effectively relegating them to irrelevance at that stage of the analysis. Paradoxically,
then, Irwin Toy’s generous interpretation of expression undermined s. 2(b), because
its prima facie standard of breach rendered analysis of the nature and severity of the
violation unnecessary.
Section 2(b)’s analytical framework is complicated by Irwin Toy’s second step,
the purpose-effects test, which asks whether the government action purposely
violates expressive freedom or adversely affects it.27 Though most interferences are
purposeful – in the sense of placing “direct or facial” limits on expressive activity
– the claimant bears a more onerous standard of proving a s. 2(b) breach for those
that are not. Under Irwin Toy, effects-based interferences with expressive freedom
do not violate s. 2(b) unless the claimant establishes that the activity adversely
affected by state action advances the guarantee’s underlying values, namely, the
Ford values.28 This test is confusing because it is inconsistent with step one’s
24

Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at
969 (S.C.C.) (stating that if an activity conveys or attempts to convey meaning it has
expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope of s. 2(b)). Elliot noted with surprise
that the Ford values did not play a role or inﬂuence Irwin Toy’s deﬁnition of expression. R.
Elliot, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of Truth, and Knowledge and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting
Freedom of Expression: Part I – Taking Stock” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R.(2d) 436, at 445.
25

The Court stated that freedom of expression was entrenched so that “everyone can
manifest their thoughts, opinion, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however
unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream”. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 969 (S.C.C.).
26
Subject to the purpose-effects test, which does not apply in every case, there is a prima
facie breach of s. 2(b) whenever the government interferes with “any attempt to convey
meaning”. The caveat to the attempt-to-convey meaning test is the Court’s exclusion, under
step one, for “violent forms of expression” from s. 2(b) (at 970).
27
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
at 978-79 (S.C.C.) (summarizing the test).
28
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
at 976 (S.C.C.) (stating that to establish a breach, the plaintiff must state her claim “with
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principle of content neutrality.29 Moreover, and though it plays a muted role in the
jurisprudence, Irwin Toy’s overlay of purpose-effects analysis is problematic.30 By
undermining a concept of freedom based on content neutrality, the effects-based
analysis demonstrated how the Ford values could be used to exclude content from
s. 2(b). As explained below, under the guise of a contextual approach, a very similar
analysis quickly surfaced in the s.1 analysis.
In combination, Ford and Irwin Toy present a perplexing and anomalous concept
of expressive freedom. The Ford values do not advance a theory of freedom, and in
any case were sidelined by Irwin Toy, except when used to impose a content-related
burden on effects-based violations of s. 2(b). The prima facie scope of entitlement
and pro forma presence of Ford values are the hallmarks of a methodology that fails
to engage with the infringement and its implications for expressive freedom. In
joining a thin concept of entitlement with an extensive analysis of limits under s. 1,
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott provides a compelling
illustration of the consequences. There, the Court’s discussion of s. 2(b) was
completed in a single paragraph and was followed by a s. 1 analysis that was 88
paragraphs long.31 Regrettably, Whatcott is not atypical, but indicative of the lack of
balance – or proportionality, to invoke a revered Charter concept – between the
Court’s treatment of breach and justiﬁcation in s. 2(b) cases.32
reference to the principles and values underlying the freedom”) and 977 (adding that she must
“identify the meaning being conveyed and how it relates to the pursuit of truth, participation
in the community, or individual self-fulﬁllment and human ﬂourishing”).
29

Despite identifying it as the underlying assumption of s. 2(b), Irwin Toy did little more
to develop the principle of content neutrality, or treat it as an imperative and requirement for
the protection of expressive freedom. The tension between step one’s content neutrality and
the content-based inquiry of step two’s effects-based violations remains intact in s. 2(b). As
explained, the contextual approach would facilitate a content-based approach to the
justiﬁcation of limits under s. 1.
30
The Ford values also play a role on questions of s. 2(b) access to government property
and information. See Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005]
3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 73 (S,C,C,) (stating that s. 2(b) protects access to public property where
expressive content is not in conﬂict with the guarantee’s three central purposes); Ontario v.
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, [2013] S.C.J. No. 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
(addressing s. 2(b) access to information).
31

Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013]
1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.). Compare para. 62 (agreeing with the Commission’s concession that
the statutory provision violated s. 2(b)), and paras. 63-151 (discussing the justiﬁability of the
violation under s. 1 of the Charter).
32
But see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 725-34 (S.C.C.)
(per Dickson C.J.C.) and 802-43 (per McLachlin J., in dissent) (providing an elaborate
discussion of s. 2(b) and its scope of protection); R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) (per McLachlin J., at 751-60) discussing the scope of s. 2(b) and the
guarantee’s reasons for protecting beliefs the majority regards as wrong or false. By the time
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Toward a conception of freedom
After 40 years, s. 2(b) lacks an iconic statement of free expression’s inherent and
transcending value. Part of the problem is that, unlike other guarantees, s. 2(b)’s
freedom of expression has not had a champion – a jurist willing to theorize and
defend freedom in principle and across issues.33 Nor is the genesis of the Ford
values rooted in Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence; rather, s. 2(b)’s foundations
trace to and essentially re-state the underpinnings of the First Amendment’s free
speech clause. In the United States, the jurisprudence grants free speech powerful
and at times inspired protection that is complemented by a rich scholarly literature
on free speech.34 In Canada, the s. 2(b) jurisprudence surprisingly makes scarce
reference to a pre-Charter jurisprudence that displayed a forceful, compelling, and
unexpected defence of freedom.35 Rather than consult that pre-Charter legacy and
learn from its response to government repression, Ford borrowed abstract values
of Whatcott, the general analysis under s. 2(b) was abbreviated and the question of breach was
often conceded.
33

Some of its most signiﬁcant s. 2(b) decisions protecting expressive freedom are
authored by different members of the Court. See, e.g., Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v.
MacIntyre, [1982] S.C.J. No. 1, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.) (Dickson J., pre-Charter);
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (S.C.C.)
(McLachlin J., dissenting); Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No.
104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) (Lamer C.J.C.); Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) (Bastarache J.); Re
Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.) (Iacobucci and Arbour
JJ.); Montreal (City) c. 2951-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141
(S.C.C.) (Binnie J., dissenting); and R. v. Vice Media Ltd., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, [2018] 3
S.C.R. 374 (S.C.C.) (Abella J., concurring).
34

See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (2019); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); New York Times Co. v. the United States (The
Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971); and Cohen v. California, 4 03 U.S. 15 (1971),
among others. In addition, a vibrant First Amendment literature continues the search for a
single organizing principle to ground the free speech clause. Each of the Ford values has
analogues and advocates in this exercise, though characteristically there is little agreement on
whether a sole principle can or should be found, much less what it might be. See, e.g., A.
Tsesis, “Free Speech Constitutionalism”, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1015 (explaining why none of
the accepted rationales is sufficient on its own and proposing “uniﬁed statement of free speech
theory”).
35

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.)
(“Alberta Press”, or The Alberta Press Case”); R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951]
S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299
(S.C.C.); Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.). These
decisions are cited from time to time in the jurisprudence, on their own and in combination,
but not to ground or create a foundation for s. 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom.
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from the First Amendment.36
On the principal issue of freedom and its meaning under s. 2(b), this proposal
draws inspiration from, and is anchored in, four pre-Charter decisions on expressive
freedom, the “legacy” jurisprudence. Hidden in plain sight, this jurisprudence
comprises The Alberta Press Case, R. v. Boucher, Saumur v. City of Quebec, and
Switzman v. Elbling.37 As timely as ever, these decisions offers a foundation that can
enrich s. 2(b)’s conception of freedom and inform the analysis of breach.
A dynamic episode in Canadian constitutionalism that began with The Alberta
Press Case continued with a prosecution for seditious libel in Boucher, Saumur’s
bylaw scheme of street censorship, and Switzman’s padlock law aimed at halting the
propagation of communism and bolshevism on residential premises. In combination,
these decisions reached a jurisprudential apex for freedom that arguably has not
been attained in 40 years under the Charter. Pronouncements that represent
expressive freedom’s true and forgotten foundations should now be brought
forward.
Confronting the threat to freedom is the distinction and genius of these decisions.
The Court’s focus on the nature and severity of the interference with freedom in
these cases is striking, especially when juxtaposed with the absence of a Charter
counterpart and the emptiness of the s. 2(b) analysis. What especially sets the legacy
jurisprudence apart is the way members of the Court countered the state’s repressive
actions by defending freedom. Not content with reciting abstract values, the judges
responded with opinions rich in the rhetoric of freedom. These opinions did not
consider the violation a pro forma breach, as occurs under s. 2(b), but treated it as
the catalyst for an inspired commitment to freedom. As such, these legacy decisions
foreshadowed and aligned with Big M’s deﬁnition of freedom as the absence of
coercion and constraint.38
For members of the Court, a threat that could not adequately be addressed by the
division of powers called for a ﬂedging theory of freedom. Though Rand J. was the
36

In addition to citing the First Amendment jurisprudence on free speech, the Court cited
R. Sharpe, “Commercial Expression and the Charter”, (1987), 37 U.T.L.J. 229, at 232
(endorsing the First Amendment’s rationales for free speech under the Charter). See R. Elliot,
“The Supreme Court’s Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of
Truth, and Knowledge and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting Freedom of
Expression: Part I – Taking Stock” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R.(2d) 436 at 444 (stating that at no point
in this discussion did the Court consider its own early Charter decisions, and that nor did it
mention the pre-Charter jurisprudence – the legacy decisions in this article – that explain the
beneﬁts to society that ﬂow from freedom of expression).
37
Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); Saumur v. Québec (City),
[1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.); Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No.
13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).
38

R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
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pioneer and champion of this initiative, a number of other jurists, including Duff
C.J.C. and Cannon, Estey, Locke, Cartwright, Kellock, and Abbott JJ., actively
defended freedom of expression.39 Years before the Charter, these four bold
decisions pressed up against the limits of the Court’s constitutional authority. That
the Court lodged its views awkwardly under the structure of federalism does not
detract from the creation of a jurisprudential foundation for freedom. Instead, the
doctrinal and institutional obstacles to protecting freedom underscore the courage of
these moments in Supreme Court history.
In the absence of textual rights, the Court had little choice but to ﬁt its conception
of freedom into the broader legal and constitutional tradition. Perhaps because it was
not tethered to a text – like the Charter’s framework of breach and justiﬁcation – the
Court’s conception of freedom was unrehearsed, organic, and authentic. Looking
back, what stands out is how much could be said – even within the limits of a
division of powers framework – about freedom and its foundational place in
Canadian constitutionalism.
In The Alberta Press Case, the scale and gravity of repression impelled Duff
C.J.C. and Cannon J. to intervene in defence of freedom.40 Legislation requiring
newspapers to print government propaganda and disclose all sources of information,
under threat of being shut down for non-compliance, granted “autocratic powers”
that could be “arbitrarily wielded” to frustrate the rights, not only of Albertans, but
of “the people of Canada as a whole”.41 Justice Cannon’s opinion denounced the
government’s attempt to “prevent a free and untrammelled discussion” and “reduce
any opposition to silence” as a dangerous affront to the “free working of the political
39
See Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.)
(Duff C.J.C.; Cannon J.); R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.)
(Rand, Kellock, Estey, and Cartwright JJ.); Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.) (Rand, Kerwin, Kellock, Estey, and Locke JJ.); Switzman v.
Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.) (Rand and Abbott JJ.).
40

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.). Bill
9 was part of a package of measures enacted by Alberta’s Social Credit government, and was
titled “An Act to Ensure the Publication of Accurate News and Information”. The press law
was ancillary to ultra vires legislation and unconstitutional for that reason. Though it was
unnecessary to address the government’s repression of expressive and press freedom, Duff
C.J.C., with Davis J. concurring, stated that there were “some further observations” which
“may properly be made”. Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938]
S.C.R. 100, at 132 (S.C.C.). Justice Cannon was alone in ﬁnding that Bill 9 also violated the
division of powers. See R. Haigh, “The Kook, the Chief, Some Strife and the Lawyers:
William Aberhart and the Alberta References of 1938” (2019) 39 N.J.C.L 1 (examining the
political concept of social credit, the Alberta premier, and the three Reference decisions of
1938).
41
Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 135
(S.C.C.) (per Duff C.J.C.) (emphasis added).
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organization of the Dominion”.42 The legislation not only nulliﬁed the rights of
Albertans, but affected the political rights of citizens in other provinces who have a
“vital interest” in access to full information and comment, both favourable and
unfavourable, about the policies of the Alberta Government.43 The legislation’s
silencing of political opposition prompted Cannon J. to declare that freedom of
discussion is “essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic State”, and
therefore cannot be curtailed without affecting “the right of the people” for access
to information on questions of public interest from sources independent of the
government.44
Chief Justice Duff and Cannon J. asserted that democratic institutions derive their
“efficacy” from the free public discussion of affairs, including a citizen’s “fundamental right to express freely his untrammelled opinion about government policies
and discuss matters of public opinion”, and an “untrammelled publication of the
news and political opinions of the political parties contending for ascendancy”.45
The Chief Justice’s commitment to the “freest and fullest” examination from every
point of view – which he described as the very “breath of life for parliamentary
institutions” – could not be compromised by abuse, including grave abuse.46
Whether in criticism or counter-criticism, attack or counter-attack, freedom was so
vital, in his view, that abuses, including those that are “constantly exempliﬁed before
our eyes”, should be dismissed as little more than “incidental mischiefs”.47
Shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada became the country’s ﬁnal court of
appeal in 1949, Quebec’s suppression of religious and expressive freedom in the
1950s generated three magniﬁcent decisions that drew strength from The Alberta
Press Case.48 By targeting religious and political minorities and singling them out
for persecution under the law, the province provoked the Court to defend freedom
qua freedom. The key opinions in Boucher, Saumur, and Switzman reﬂect the
insight that the true issue at stake was the freedom, and not the content of
expression.
42

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 144, 146
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
43
Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 146
(S.C.C.).
44

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.).

45

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 133 (per
Duff C.J.C) and 146 (per Cannon J.) (S.C.C.).
46
Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 133
(S.C.C.).
47

Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.).

48

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); Saumur v. Québec
(City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.); Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J.
No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).
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In narrow terms, the question in Boucher v. the King was whether a religious
pamphlet by the Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted an act of sedition against the
state.49 A majority held that, short of incitement, expressive activity that promotes
ill will between groups, even to the point of hatred, cannot be criminalized, because
that would “very seriously curtail the liberty of the press and of individuals to
engage in discussion of any controversial topic”.50 Justice Kellock asserted that the
instigator, not the distributor of a pamphlet, is responsible for any breach of the
peace.51 Justice Rand added that the clash of critical discussion on political, social
and religious subjects has “too deeply become the stuff of life” for “mere ill-will”
to be the test of illegality.52
Justice Rand’s remarks on difference and dissent set the foundations for a theory
of freedom for Canadian constitutionalism. His forceful rhetoric praised the “clash
of critical discussion” – including “controversial fury”, “fanatical puritanism”, and
hostility – as the hallmarks of freedom.53 He proclaimed that disagreement in ideas
and beliefs, on “every conceivable subject”, is “of the essence of our life” and is
“part of our living”.54 In this view, “our compact of free society” absorbs the
“subjective incidents of controversy” within the framework of freedom and order,
because a process of free exchange “ultimately serves us in stimulation, in the
clariﬁcation of thought and . . . the search for the constitution and truth of things
generally”.55 Justice Rand accepted it as “part of the compact” that Boucher’s
pamphlet would provoke and inﬂame. Though it was a “burning protest”, the
49

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) (acquitting Boucher of
a charge of seditious libel, by a 5-4 vote, because there was no evidence on which a properly
instructed jury could ﬁnd him guilty). See Kerwin J., at 283 (stating that seditious libel
requires an intent to incite the people to violence against constituted authority or to create a
public disturbance or disorder against that authority); Cartwright J. at 333 (stating that the
intended or probable consequences of any promotion of ill-will and hostility is to produce
disturbance of or resistance to the government’s authority); Kellock J. at 301; and Estey J. at
315 (conﬁrming that an intention to incite violence or disorder against the state is essential).
50

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 333 (S.C.C.) (per Cartwright

J.).
51

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 301 (S.C.C.) (stating that any
other view would “elevate mob violence to a place of supremacy”, and adding that “the
lawbreakers are those who resort to violence rather than those who exercise the right of free
speech in advocating religious views however such views may be unacceptable to the
former”).
52
R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.) (per Rand J.)
(reinforcing the view that creating disaffection or ill-will or hostility short of illegal conduct
is not a crime).
53

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.).

54

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).

55

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
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pamphlet represented an expression of “deep indignation” and an “earnest petition”
to the province to discontinue its “iniquitous treatment” of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.56
Within two years, the Court considered another test of provincial authority when
Saumur, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, challenged a Quebec City bylaw
forbidding the distribution of any literature on city streets without ﬁrst obtaining
written permission from the Chief of Police.57 A majority found that the bylaw was
not enacted in relation to streets, but regulated “the minds of the users of the streets”
and was clearly an instance of censorship.58 More to the point, the bylaw was an
offence to freedom because it granted the Chief of Police the power to control street
activity that had been taking place “since time immemorial”.59 The uncensored
printed word is the “bête noire of the dogmatists”, and the threat of censorship posed
by the bylaw was therefore pervasive, even contagious, and capable of spreading
from religious to political and other points of view.60 Noting its “commendable
frankness” in conceding the point, Locke J. considered the City’s overt goal of
censorship a matter of “profound importance” to “all of the people of this
country”.61
Finally, Switzman considered provincial legislation that criminalized the propagation of communism or bolshevism in any house, and authorized the province to
close, or “padlock” such premises.62 While a majority on the panel invalidated the
legislation as ultra vires under the division of powers, some judges addressed the
demands of freedom. For instance, Abbott J. strenuously defended the right of free
expression on social, political or economic matters, describing this freedom as
essential to the “working of a parliamentary democracy” and suggesting in obiter
56

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 291 (S.C.C.).

57

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.)
(concluding, by a 5-4 majority, that the bylaw did not extend to the distribution of literature
in the streets).
58
Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 338 (per
Kellock J.) and 379 (per Locke J.) (S.C.C.).
59
Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 361 and 332
(S.C.C.) (stating, per Rand J., that the distribution of any newspaper, tract, or handbill, was
placed under the “uncontrolled discretion of a municipal officer” and that the province could
even permit all others but forbid a newspaper or any writing of a particular colour from being
distributed in the streets).
60

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 326 (S.C.C.).

61

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 368-69 and 370
(S.C.C.).
62

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.). By a margin of
8-1, the Court found that An Act Respecting Communistic Propaganda was ultra vires the
province as a regulation of the criminal law.
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that even Parliament cannot abrogate this right.63
Justice Rand wrote forcefully in defence of freedom – as he had in Boucher and
Saumur – denouncing the statute’s attempt to prevent “a poisoning of men’s minds”,
shield individuals from exposure to “dangerous ideas”, and protect them from their
own “thinking propensities”.64 He was particularly troubled that the object of the
prohibition could “just as properly have been the suppression of any other political,
economic or social doctrine or theory”.65 Justice Rand maintained, to the contrary,
that “government by the free public opinion of an open society” demands the
“condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”.66 In stating
that freedom of discussion has a “unity of interest and signiﬁcance extending
equally to every part of the Dominion”, Rand J. pressed the Court’s constitutional
authority to its limit but stopped short of creating an enforceable substantive right.67
A divided Court vindicated the freedom claim in each of the Quebec decisions. A
number of judges resisted the repression of expressive freedom and voiced
unparalleled concern for the gravitas of the violation. An emergent theory of
freedom is more developed in Rand J.’s opinions, and though his conception
warrants much closer attention, including critical scrutiny, key themes can be
noted.68 First is Rand J.’s conception of the relationship between the democratic
community and its government. As he explained in Boucher, “the administrators of
what we call democratic government have come to be looked upon as servants,
bound to carry out their duties accountably to the public”.69 In Saumur he added that
if free discussion is placed under license, its basic condition would be destroyed and
the government, as licensor, would be “disjoined from the citizenry”.70 Finally,
Switzman stated that “[p]arliamentary government postulates a capacity in men,
acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves”.71 Meeting that
responsibility in turn demands a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of
63

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 328 (S.C.C.).

64

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 305 (S.C.C.) (per Rand

J.).
65

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).

66

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306 (S.C.C.).

67

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).

68

See I. Rand, “The Role of an Independent Judiciary in Preserving Freedom” (1951) 9
U. Tor. L.J. 1-14; see also W. Kaplan, Canadian Maverick: The Life and Times of Ivan C.
Rand, Chapter 4 (“The Framework of Freedom”) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2009); J. Penney, “Ivan Rand’s Ancient Constitutionalism” (2010) 34 Man. L.J. 43.
69

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.). See also
Kellock J. at 294-5 (stating that every member of the public who censures the rule is “ﬁnding
fault with his servant”).
70

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330 (S.C.C.).

71

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306 (S.C.C.).
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ideas.72 In short, and without putting it quite that way, he recognized that freedom
is a requisite of democratic accountability and an essential feature of a functioning
democracy.
Second, Rand J. did not limit the right of free public opinion and debate to the
precincts of parliamentary government. He described freedom of speech as one of
the “original freedoms” that are the “necessary attributes and modes of selfexpression of human beings and the primary condition of their community life
within a legal order”.73 In Switzman, Rand J. stated that this “constitutional” fact, of
virtually free access to ideas, is the “political” expression of the primary condition
of “social” life, thought and its communication by language.74 In that conception,
liberty is elemental and “little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is
to his physical existence”.75 To Rand J., freedom is paramount, stopping “only at
perimeters where the foundation of the freedom itself is threatened”.76 Apart from
sedition, obscenity and criminal libel, the “literary, discursive and polemic use of
language” are, in the broadest sense, free.77
Third, Rand J. focused on the gravitas of the threat to freedom. In Switzman, as
well as in Saumur, he emphasized that the government could just as easily target any
other expressive content it found objectionable.78 The freedom at risk in each
instance placed the principle of freedom at risk everywhere. In such circumstances,
explaining what was fundamentally at stake brought him close to an all-embracing
conception of freedom. In Saumur, Rand J. declared that “[t]he only security is
steadily advancing enlightenment, for which the widest range of controversy is the
sine qua non”.79 Though his precise meaning is unclear, Rand J.’s use of
“enlightenment” suggests an open, process-oriented, at times combative, and
content-neutral concept of free discussion and exchange. Echoing Duff C.J.C.’s
view that its abuse is “an incidental mischief”, Rand J. described freedom as the
residue within a periphery where the positive law operates to create “minor
72

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).

73

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 329 (S.C.C.).

74

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306 (S.C.C.).

75

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).
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Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.).
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Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.). Echoing Duff
C.J.C.’s view that its abuse is “an incidental mischief”, Rand J. described freedom as the
residue that within a periphery where the positive law operates to create “minor exceptions”
to liberty. Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 329
(S.C.C.).
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Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 305 (S.C.C.).
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Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330 (S.C.C.)
(emphasis added).
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exceptions” to liberty.80 As he emphasized in all three opinions, limits on freedom
are not the norm but, instead, are exceptional and peripheral in nature.
Enduring themes emerge from this jurisprudence. In this legacy, freedom is
process-oriented and in its time, strikingly neutral and capacious in scope. A range
of opinions from members of the Court accepted rigorous, disputatious, and even
hostile exchange as inherent and welcome properties of freedom. Prescient and in
anticipation of Big M, their judicial instincts were trained on government repression
and the threat it posed to the integrity of freedom. For s. 2(b)’s purposes, it matters
little that the Court’s burgeoning conception of freedom was not rooted in text, or
that it drew on disparate images and strands of jurisprudential thought. On any
measure, the legacy decisions offer a wealth of insight that should inform the
interpretation of s. 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom. Even and especially on
the Charter’s 40th anniversary, this legacy remains relevant and can play a pivotal
role in s. 2(b)’s renewal.
2. The ﬁrst foundation: a conception of freedom under s. 2(b)
Re-aligning s. 2(b)’s methodology is not a simple or modest task, and is addressed
here in two steps. First is a principle or theory of freedom that must offer more than
a re-consideration of Ford values and their role in the s. 2(b) analysis.81 As
discussed, the Ford values explain why expressive content is valuable but overlook
the value of freedom. A conception of freedom itself – apart from the merits of
expressive content – was lost in the interpretation of s. 2(b). Second, a concept alone
cannot protect freedom, and in turn must be reﬂected in a principled approach to the
question of breach. This proposal reconﬁgures the current methodology by
eliminating step two of Irwin Toy and replacing it with s. 2(a)’s standard of
infringement.
On the threshold question of freedom, the legacy jurisprudence provides
leadership on two key points: the core value of freedom and the gravity or threat to
freedom inherent in its repression by the government. While some judges expressed
grave concerns about the censorial and repressive acts of government – describing
their consequences for a culture of free public discussion – Rand J.’s opinions were
more seeking in nature. In his search to ﬁnd and express freedom’s core value, or
truth, Rand J. developed a conception that is content-neutral, process-based, and
80

Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 329 (S.C.C.).
In R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.), he stated that even
in “discontent, affection and hostility”, ideas “ultimately serve[] us in stimulation, in the
clariﬁcation of thought and . . . the search for the constitution and truth of things generally”.
81
At present, the Ford values are incorporated into the test for effects-based infringements, which require proof that the expressive activity seeking s. 2(b)’s protection serves
those values. As discussed above, evaluating the value of its content to determine whether s.
2(b) has been infringed is contrary to content neutrality and the protection of expressive
freedom.
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grounded in a view of expression as an agent of enlightenment, or change. Thus he
spoke of freedom’s purposes, variously, as being linked to “stimulation”, the
“clariﬁcation of thought”, and the “search for the constitution and truth of things
generally”.82 Justice Rand described freedom of speech as one of the “original
freedoms” that are the “necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human
beings and the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order”.83
Critically, Rand J.’s conception separated freedom from its content, and shifted the
focus from the substance of expressive activity to the principle of freedom.
It remains to relate the elements of this nascent conception of freedom to the Ford
values and s. 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom. In primal terms, freedom tests
a democratic community’s courage to confront its own doubts and fears, and to
summon humility in the face of what is unknown, unknowable, and uncertain.84 In
this matrix, the social and political freedom to challenge, test, and engage in
discourse animates a process of change that democratic society depends on for its
vitality and progress. That process of engagement is subject to limits but, in
principle and at its forefront, is organic, fortuitous, and free.
Under this conception, freedom is consistent with Irwin Toy’s principle of content
neutrality because it enables an open process of free exchange. A conception of
freedom focused on processes of discovery, debate, and dispute bears resemblance
to the truth-seeking function of the Ford values and the First Amendment tradition.
The drawback in promoting truth as an organizing principle of freedom is that the
concept is abstract, philosophic, religious, and empirical; what is or is not truth is
contested, as well as endlessly and inevitably elusive.85 By contrast, a truth-seeking
rationale places the emphasis elsewhere, on the process of search. Under that
variation, truth is an aspiration and not an outcome. A functional approach to
freedom protects the process of seeking truth, regardless whether truth can be or is
found. In principle, that process of search and discovery is freedom’s truth.
A theory of freedom grounded in a process of free exchange references Holmes
J.’s magnetic and ever contested “marketplace of ideas” metaphor. In Abrams v.
United States, Holmes J. spoke of “free trade in ideas” and the “competition of the
market” as the best test of truth and the foundation of the First Amendment’s free
82

R. v. Boucher, [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.).
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Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 329 (S.C.C.).
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See also J. Cameron, “Big M’s Forgotten Legacy of Freedom”, in B. Bird, D. Newman
& D. Ross, eds., The Forgotten Fundamental Freedoms of the Charter, (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2020) at 38-41 (providing a preliminary discussion or account of freedom).
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See D. Ross, “Truth-Seeking and the Unity of the Charter’s Fundamental Freedoms”,
in B. Bird, D. Newman & D. Ross, eds., The Forgotten Fundamental Freedoms of the
Charter, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2020) at 63-111 (suggesting that the search for truth
is the “hypergood” that connects s. 2’s fundamental freedoms).
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speech clause.86 Few constitutional metaphors have attracted more scholarly
attention and critical scrutiny, and while Holmes J.’s elements of “truth” and
“marketplace” may not have stood the test of time, the conception of a contest
between ideas not only endures but continues to intrigue, in Canada as well as the
United States.87
One of the First Amendment’s foremost scholars, Vincent Blasi, attempted to
rescue the Abrams metaphor from its improvident roots in marketplace behaviour.
He shifted the concept away from that analogy and moved toward another theme in
Holmes J.’s philosophy: value skepticism and an ethic of fallibilism.88 In this view,
certain truth is disarmed by contingency and uncertainty, and therefore cannot claim
infallibility; rather, freedom serves the goal of “truth-locating”. Accepting that truth
cannot be deﬁned for all times and purposes, freedom of speech provides a
“comparatively reliable social mechanism for identifying error, for locating truth
and, in the aggregate, for advancing social knowledge”.89 What can be attained, in
the face of fallibility, is a commitment to the process of truth seeking that both
requires, and depends on, a principle of freedom.
The value of freedom, in this account, is that it provides a counterpoint to a
“[c]onformity, deference to authority, stasis, [and] passivity in the realm of beliefs”
that is “not just unfortunate or unwise but dangerous”.90 In that environment, voices
of difference and dissent can generate “some of the grievances, aspirations and
mobilizations that force political adaptation and transformation”.91 In this, it must be
accepted and understood that protecting freedom according to principle is not
cost-free. Yet the “remote harms” that are associated with or attributed to expression
that is subversive of social values should not be regulated, because the legitimate
and ongoing process of challenging and displacing dominant forces is inseparable
86

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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F. Schauer, “Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective
Knowledge” (2017) 70 S.M.U. Law Rev. 231 at 231 (acknowledging that the marketplace of
ideas and a basic concept of freedom of speech as enabling a society to increase its level of
knowledge, to facilitate its identiﬁcation of truth, and to expose error “has a wide and
persistent currency”). In the case of Canada, see below note 97.
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V. Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, at 19 (noting
that “fallibilism” traces to the British empiricist tradition in philosophy, to Mill’s essay On
Liberty, and the tenet that all propositions are subject to perpetual testing); see also V. Blasi,
“Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein”
(2011) 97 Virg. L. Rev. 531.
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F. Schauer, “Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective
Knowledge” (2017) 70 S.M.U. Law Rev. 231 at 237.
90

V. Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 29
(emphasis added).
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V. Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 39.
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from the process of “adaptive political change”.92
In this rendering, freedom has modest aspirations. It makes no claim that
expressive content is progressive or valuable, and does not promise it will achieve
any, or demonstrable objectives. There are no “heroic assumptions regarding human
rationality or self-correcting social dynamics”, and no promise of “wisdom through
mass deliberation”.93 In trusting to a process of open discussion and exchange, this
model speaks to Rand J.’s aspiration of “steadily advancing enlightenment”.94 It
accepts that there will be steps forward and back, and progress as well as setbacks.95
With the risks it entails, this principle of freedom offers the goal and opportunity to
seek the “truth of things generally”, mindful and hopeful of achieving progressive
objectives along the way.
Section 2(b)’s renewal begins with a vitalized conception of freedom. While
Holmes J.’s rationale was discounted for its marketplace and economic analogies,
Rand J.’s conception of a link between freedom and the quest for truth or
enlightenment has been overlooked and overshadowed by the Ford values and a
focus on the value of content. As yet, the s. 2(b) jurisprudence has not fully grasped
why freedom – qua freedom – is indispensable to democratic life, and that is
because it advances, promotes, enables, and even forces change. A conception of
freedom as the agent of change – or change maker – has pedigree in the legacy
jurisprudence, in the Ford values and their endorsement of truth-seeking, and in a
re-modelled and non-economic version of Holmes’s process theory of freedom.96
Freedom conceived this way cannot be ﬂabby or timid, and must accept the limits
of our knowledge and expectations, as individuals and as a community. Democratic
92

V. Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 44.
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V. Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 44-45.
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Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330 (S.C.C.).
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See F. Schauer, “Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective
Knowledge” (2017) 70 S.M.U. Law Rev. 231 at 251 (asking how a society can ﬁnd truth in
the aggregate, what it is for society to know something, and why determining what a society
knows may not be as simple as a tally of what constituent members know).
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See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 802-8 (S.C.C.)
(per McLachlin J., in dissent, providing a philosophical view of expressive freedom and
stating, at 803, that “[w]hile freedom of expression provides no guarantee that the truth will
always prevail, its still can be argued that it assists in promoting the truth in ways which
would be impossible without the freedom”; emphasis in original); Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 68 (S.C.C.) (explaining that a
functioning democracy supports a continuous process of discussion, the marketplace of ideas,
and the inclusion of dissenting voices); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45,
at para. 21 (S.C.C.) (per McLachlin C.J.C., stating that “[t]he right to freedom of expression
rests on the conviction that the best route to truth, individual ﬂourishing, and peaceful
coexistence in a heterogeneous society in which people hold divergent and conﬂicting beliefs
lies in the free ﬂow of ideas and beliefs”).
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society is restless and dynamic, contingent and changing. That is its strength but also
a source of fear, including fear of freedom. Surely, the most compelling lesson of the
legacy jurisprudence is that fear centres on those who dissent or speak in a different
voice. That jurisprudence also provides compelling demonstration of the irrevocable
link between freedom and the principle of democracy, as subsequently identiﬁed in
the Secession Reference as one of the Constitution’s cornerstone unwritten constitutional principles.97
3. A conception of breach under s. 2(b)
The question of breach is currently governed by Irwin Toy and its two-step test.
Beyond providing a prima facie criterion that is easily satisﬁed, the attempt-toconvey meaning test adds little depth to the analysis. In re-drawing the standard for
breach under s. 2(b), this proposal eliminates step 2 of the Irwin Toy test and
replaces it with the standard of infringement for s. 2(a)’s guarantee for freedom of
conscience and religion. Accordingly, a violation of s. 2(b) is established when the
government’s interference with expressive freedom is more than trivial or insubstantial.98 In addition, the freedom principle must be reﬂected in an analysis that
engages, under that step, with the nature and severity of the violation.
Over the years, calls for a re-calibration of Irwin Toy, in particular to claw back
s. 2(b)’s broad, undifferentiated protection, have gone unanswered.99 Though limits
can readily be upheld under s. 1, it is offensive to some that indisputably criminal,
hostile, or offensive expression is granted any constitutional recognition at all.100
Revisiting Irwin Toy could address some of s. 2(b)’s counter-intuitive examples,
such as perjury and fraud, which are prima facie protected under step one of the test.
In addition, excluding narrowly prescribed content or drawing distinctions between
categories of expression could boost protection for s. 2(b) by raising the standard of
justiﬁcation under s. 1.101 Yet to this day, Irwin Toy remains steadfast and
97
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras.
61-69 (S.C.C.) (explaining, at para. 68, that the principle of democracy includes a continuous
process of discussion, the marketplace of ideas, and the inclusion of dissenting voices).
98
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 59
(S.C.C.), discussed below at II, 3. ” A conception of breach under s. 2(b)”.
99
See, e.g., R. Elliot, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy Framework for
Freedom of Expression” (2011) 15 Rev. of Const. Studies 205; C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy:
A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under the Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current
Law and Law Reform 21.
100
See R. Elliott, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy Framework for
Freedom of Expression” (2011) 15 Rev. of Const. Studies 205 at 219, 217 (stating that the
Ford rationales should be used to determine the scope of freedom of expression under s. 2(b),
and that threatening violence, telling deliberate lies, extortion, counselling the commission of
a crime, and fraudulent misrepresentations, among other content-deﬁned categories, should
be excluded from s. 2(b)).
101

See C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under
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implacably in place as the governing precedent on freedom of expression.102
Section 2(b) doctrine should be modiﬁed but not, as suggested above, to add
content-based substantive standards or exclude categories of expression from the
Charter. Freedom breeds doubt and can pose danger to the status quo. For that
reason, its place in our order of values is vulnerable, easily overridden in times of
trouble, turmoil, and doubt. Section 2(b)’s imperative of freedom must prevail to the
point at which expressive activity poses a risk of demonstrable harm to the
community. That is where limits on freedom can be justiﬁed, but only under the
discipline of a rigorous s.1 analysis. Put another way, expressive content and any
harm it might cause are in principle extraneous to the initial question whether the
government has violated s. 2(b).103
Irwin Toy’s principle of prima facie protection for all content of expression is
sound, but cannot serve as the standard that moves the analysis from s. 2(b) to s. 1
without more. Before s. 1 is engaged, the nature and gravitas of the violation must
be registered under s. 2(b). Speciﬁcally, courts must examine and explain the insult
to freedom, as well as its consequences for expressive freedom and the guarantee’s
underlying values. That is imperative because, at present, the s. 2(b) analysis is
bereft of this element, and expressive freedom is severely disadvantaged under s. 1
as a result. Not to address this gap leaves the analysis incomplete, sending a
barebones ﬁnding of breach to s. 1.104
Before addressing that task, Irwin Toy’s second step – the purpose-effects test –
must be dropped from the methodology of breach. The purpose-effects test is
infrequently invoked and plays a limited role in the s. 2(b) analysis. More to the
point, the standard for effects-based violations imposes a burden on claimants to
establish the value of expressive content.105 That burden is inconsistent with the
the Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform 21 (proposing an approach that
would ensure that limits on “core” expressive content would be properly subjected to a
heightened level of scrutiny).
102
It should be noted that issue-speciﬁc doctrines have evolved to address the open court
principle, the status of the press and media, access to government property for s. 2(b)
purposes, and the scope of positive obligations under s. 2(b) of the Charter. These are not
addressed in this article.
103

The caveat is Irwin Toy’s exclusion for violent forms of expression and the Court’s
deﬁnition of this concept. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 970 (S.C.C.); and Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v.
Canadian Federation of Students, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, at 315 (S.C.C.)
(excluding violent expression and threats of violence from the scope of s. 2(b)).
104

As noted, the jurisprudence to date demonstrates how the imbalance between breach
and justiﬁcation has worked against expressive freedom, discounting the signiﬁcance of the
violation and leaving it barren in the justiﬁcation analysis; see Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.).
105

That burden also arises under City of Montreal’s standard for determining access to
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content neutrality of step one and contrary to a concept of s. 2(b) that protects
freedom of expression. Eliminating this step nonetheless leaves s. 2(b) without a
standard of infringement and doctrinal mechanism for discussing the severity of the
violation.
In place of the purpose-effects test, Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem and its test for
violations of s. 2(a)’s guarantee of religious freedom provides a good model for s.
2(b). Speciﬁcally, Amselem’s standard of an infringement that is more than trivial or
substantial should replace the second step of Irwin Toy. The caveat is that under s.
2(b), the test of non-trivial or insubstantial interference cannot include any
consideration of the expressive activity’s impact on others.106 Section 2’s guarantees
of religious and expressive freedom are closely related, but not identical. While s.
2(a) extends the Charter’s protection to religious beliefs and practices, s. 2(b) does
not protect conduct or violent forms of expression, and a standard of infringement
that considers harm to others is inconsistent with s. 2(b)’s principle of content
neutrality. Apart from Irwin Toy’s exception for violent forms of expression, any
harm to others arising from expressive activity must be addressed as a matter of
justiﬁcation under s. 1.
A standard of non-trivial and not insubstantial interference with expressive
freedom does not signal a more onerous standard or restrictive approach to s. 2(b).
Instead, this standard is principled because it provides a doctrinal venue for
discussion and acknowledgment of the interference with expressive freedom. In
particular, the element that is missing in the current methodology – an analysis of
the nature and severity of a violation – can be incorporated into this discussion. In
analyzing the infringement, courts must acknowledge and consider how limits on
expressive freedom violate s. 2(b)’s underlying principle of freedom and its
truth-seeking, process-based rationale.
More must be said to explain how this standard of breach works and, in particular,
how it interacts with the Ford values. In brief, those values can work in tandem with
the overarching principle that expressive freedom advances a process of discovery
and exchange that seeks truth, enlightenment, and change. The values do not inform
the question of infringement by asking whether expressive activity is sufficiently
valuable to warrant protection by s. 2(b). The starting point is a violation of
freedom; from there, the Ford values can play a role in analyzing the impact of the
infringement on one or more of the guarantee’s foundational rationales (i.e.,
truth-seeking; political and social decision making; individual ﬂourishing). In this
government property under s. 2(b) of the Charter: Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc.,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.). Addressing the government property
doctrine is beyond the scope of this discussion.
106

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at paras.
59, 62-63 (S.C.C.). (stating that conduct that potentially causes harm to others would not
automatically be protected (emphasis added)).
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way, the infringement will be given the attention and gravitas that s. 2(b)’s guarantee
of expressive freedom demands.107
The objective under s. 2(b) is a generous scope of entitlement that informs a
robust and mindful consideration of the violation and its consequences for freedom.
In this way, animating a conception of freedom will fortify the analysis of breach
before the issue of reasonable limits is undertaken under s. 1. To summarize, a
revised methodology of breach retains Irwin Toy’s attempt-to-convey test, eliminates the purpose-effects step, and completes the analysis by adding a threshold test
of infringement borrowed from the s. 2(a) jurisprudence. As such, it renews s. 2(b)’s
guarantee of expressive freedom by re-setting and deepening its conceptual and
analytical foundations.
III. RESETTING THE FOUNDATIONS, PART 2: SECTION 1,
APPROACH, AND A CONCEPTION OF JUSTIFICATION

THE

CONTEXTUAL

Renewing the s. 1 methodology for violations of s. 2(b) is also imperative, but
somewhat more complex because of its implications for other Charter rights and
guarantees. While it is admittedly a piecemeal approach to s. 1 reform, this proposal
sketches the elements to s. 2(b), sketching the elements of a standard of justiﬁcation
that, when paired with the conception of breach set out above, sets a principled
framework for s. 2(b) decision making.
Where a breach of s. 2(b) requires justiﬁcation, the s. 1 analysis requires attention
to three key issues: the contextual approach, the evidentiary requirements of proof,
and the proportionality balancing of salutary beneﬁts and deleterious consequences.
As explained above, the use of context to assess the value of expressive content is
unsound in principle. More to the point, the dual roles the Ford values play under
s. 2(b) and s. 1, and their direct inﬂuence on the question of limits, are a hallmark
and central drawback of the s. 2(b) jurisprudence. The comparative irrelevance of
the Ford values under s. 2(b) becomes more pronounced when juxtaposed with their
determinative role under s. 1’s contextual approach.
This approach appeared early in s. 2(b)’s evolution before other elements of the
s.1 analysis, and especially the proportionality analysis, were developed.108 The
107

Another issue is whether the s. 2(b) analysis should consider and adopt issue-speciﬁc
standards for different categories of expression (i.e., political; commercial) and whether that
should be undertaken under s. 2(b) or s. 1. These questions are beyond the scope of this
discussion. See C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression
under the Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform 21 (proposing that
because not all expression is equally worthy of protection, tiers of scrutiny should be
introduced under s. 2(b) to direct the s. 1 analysis of reasonable limits).
108

In 1997, a few years after the contextual approach was established under s. 2(b), Peter
Hogg wrote that the Court “goes through the motion” on this test, though it has “never had
any inﬂuence on the outcome of a case”. He concluded, as a result, that this step can “safely
be ignored”. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 898. Note also
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backdrop is Oakes, which created a structured analytical framework that seemingly
failed to accommodate the context of competing values.109 Justice Wilson identiﬁed
this gap in Edmonton Journal and proposed a contextual approach to place the
values at stake “in sharp relief”.110 By directing that expressive content should be
measured against the Ford values, Dickson C.J.C. gave Wilson J.’s ﬂedgling concept
doctrinal form in R. v. Keegstra.111 Though the contextual approach provided a
mechanism for weighing values that the prevailing interpretation of Oakes did not
accommodate, that gap in the test has now been ﬁlled by an enriched form of
proportionality balancing.112
As explained, this approach facilitated a low-value designation for objectionable
content that provided a rationale for relaxing the standard of justiﬁcation. That is
how the Ford values re-surfaced under s. 1 as an unprincipled form of doctrinal
leverage that could easily justify limits on low-value expression.113 Anomalously,
the contextual approach deployed values that are designed to maximize the
protection of expressive freedom for the opposite purpose of marginalizing content
that Sethi would eliminate this step because it does little work and there is “no need for a
free-standing inquiry at this stage”. C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to
Freedom of Expression under the Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform
21, at 40. More to the point, this step of Oakes amounts to a “naked balancing exercise”..
109

Irwin Toy proposed a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation to the s.1 analysis, with the proposal for
a bifurcated standard of analysis that turned on whether the state acted as the singular
antagonist of the claimant, or in its role of mediating social concerns and allocating scarce
resources. While it remains active on occasion, this doctrinal modiﬁcation to Oakes had
mixed success, at best. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 989-90 (S.C.C.).
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Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326, at 1355 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original removed). In particular, the purpose of
this approach was to address the merits of rights and their limits in an equivalent and
contextual manner, and not to set abstract values of entitlement against competing interests.
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 761-62, 766 (S.C.C.) (incorporating the
contextual approach into the proportionality analysis, applying Royal College, and concluding that hate propaganda “contributes little” to the “quest for truth, the promotion of
individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy”;
following that analysis, restrictions on this “special category of expression” are easier to
justify). See Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.).
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See, e.g., Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37,
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) (providing a full analysis, in the majority and dissenting
opinions, of the salutary beneﬁts and deleterious consequences of a photo ID requirement that
violated the rights of members of a religious community).
113
Prior to Keegstra, McLachlin J. began the process of developing Wilson J.’s concept
of a contextual approach. In Rocket she recognized the importance of context in evaluating
expressive activity under s.1 and used this approach to evaluate the expression “in light of
s.2(b) values”. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 760-61 (S.C.C.).
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and promoting justiﬁable limits. That deﬂection of s. 2(b)’s underlying values –
from protecting freedom to justifying limits – is a betrayal of the Charter’s promise
of expressive freedom.
A declaration that expression is not valuable enough to warrant Charter protection
is a conclusion, not an evidence-based justiﬁcation. In practice, the contextual
approach’s assessment of expressive value serves as a proxy when evidence of harm
is unavailable or is equivocal.114 Eliminating the contextual approach would mean
that courts can no longer relax the standard of justiﬁcation when expressive content
is deemed to be of low value.115 Abandoning the contextual approach would return
to a methodology of limits that rests on an evidence-based conception of harm. That
approach rejects the logic that valueless and less valuable expression is harmful, or
that proof of harm is not required. Limits under s. 1 must be based on evidence that
expressive content is sufficiently linked to demonstrable harm. At the point of
considering limits and prohibitions on expression, the government must identify and
deﬁne the harm at issue, then demonstrate that its measures are carefully tailored to
target expression that can permissibly be limited.
On this, the Supreme Court’s open court jurisprudence provides principled
doctrinal leadership. In a series of decisions, the Court developed a standard of
justiﬁcation, the Dagenais/Mentuck test, that is highly protective of s. 2(b).116 One
of the key features of this jurisprudence is the requirement that judicially imposed
limits on open court rest on a “sufficient evidentiary foundation”.117 This test and its
requirement of an evidentiary basis led to a stricter standard of justiﬁcation on these
issues than under Oakes. Seemingly unaware of a disconnect between the two, the
jurisprudence has not discussed, much less resolved, this double standard.118
Incorporating a requirement of evidentiary sufficiency into the Oakes analysis can
114

See, generally, E. Macfarlane, “Hate Speech, Harm, and Rights”, in E. Macfarlane,
ed., Dilemmas of Free Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), at 35-55.
115
That raises a question – which is not answered here – whether issue-speciﬁc standards
or some differentiation of review for categories of expression (i.e., political, commercial etc.)
should be adopted and whether that is a function or breach under s. 2(b) or justiﬁcation under
s. 1 See C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under the
Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform 21.
116

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R.
835 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.) (establishing
a rigorous standard of justiﬁcation for judge-made orders that would limit access to
proceedings or place a ban on publications). See J. Cameron, “A Reﬂection on Section 2(b)’s
Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163 (praising the open justice
jurisprudence as a “section 2(b) template”).
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Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J.
No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at paras. 72, 73, 78 and 85 (S.C.C.) (reinforcing the requirement
of a sufficient factual foundation for limits on open court).
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While legislative restrictions on open justice are governed by Oakes, the Dagenais/
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harmonize these branches of s. 2(b) jurisprudence and ground an evidence-based
approach to s. 1 decision making where expressive content is at issue.
In turn, a requirement of evidentiary sufficiency engages the concept of harm and
the threshold that must be met to justify limits. Deﬁning harm and its threshold of
democratic tolerance – the point at which limits become permissible – is a complex
task. At the very least, it must be clear that a ﬁnding of harm cannot rest on the low
value of the content, or on unsubstantiated notions of “common sense” and general
knowledge (i.e., that hate speech is harmful).119 It does not suffice, for instance, that
certain communities, or the community at large, perceive content to be harmful.120
Moreover, the standard of a “reasoned apprehension of harm” must, at some
appreciable level of concreteness, state what the basis is for that apprehension.121
Setting a concept of harm into the foundation of methodology, in combination
with a retreat from the contextual approach, will ground the s.1 analysis in principle.
Yet another difficulty with a perceptive conception of harm is that it obviates the
need for carefully deﬁned restrictions on expressive freedom. That creates an
impermissible risk of regulation that is broad and inclusive, rather than narrowly
tailored to address an identiﬁable and substantiated risk of harm. Where online
content is concerned, the further concern is that expressive content can simply
disappear under various forms of take down rules, without due process or
requirements of procedural fairness.122
To the extent online communications are seemingly beyond regulation, out of
Mentuck test applies to judicial decision making and the discretion to close proceedings or
impose a ban on publication.
119

See Macfarlane, “Hate Speech, Harm, and Rights” in E. Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas of
Free Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021) at 40-45 (discussing the
question of empirically identifying harm).
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11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at paras. 132, 135 (S.C.C.) (stating that a court can use “common
sense and experience” in recognizing that activities such as hate speech inﬂict “societal
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The standard dates from R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452
(S.C.C.), where pornography was found to have low value, and has been applied in many
other contexts, including high-value electoral expression: Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at paras. 77-78 (S.C.C.).
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In this, takedown rules are in very broad and general terms the equivalent of the
bygone era of postal, book, and ﬁlm censorship. See J. Cameron, “Process Matters: Postal
Censorship, Your Ward News, and s.2(b) of the Charter”, in E. Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas of
Free Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021) at 56-75 (arguing that s. 2(b)’s
guarantee of expressive freedom must include process rights, including and especially when
the government imposes a prior restraint on the distribution or communication of expressive
content).
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control, and in need of measures to prevent harm, the answer still cannot be found
in crude mechanisms of regulation. In making recommendations for a regulatory
framework, the Report by the Canadian Commission on Democratic Expression
demonstrates that the details of online regulation are immensely challenging.123
There, the Commission’s recommendations for addressing harmful online communications proposed a regulatory framework comprising, among other things, a duty
to act responsibly, an e-tribunal, and a notice-and-notice process (for takedown).124
One of the commissioners, Jameel Jaffir, endorsed the “broad outlines”, but did not
join the Report because the “harms reduction” model and recommendations
provided no details or parameters about the scope and details of regulation.125 In
doing so, Jaffir ﬂagged a critical issue going forward: that the details of regulation
directly engage the principle of freedom. More recently, the federal government
introduced Bill C-36 and has promised further measures to regulate social media and
online communication.126 These initiatives raise serious issues about procedural
fairness under s. 2(b), as well as about the nature and scope of regulation.
These and other initiatives must be met by a renewed commitment to minimal
impairment that can guard against over-reaching in the regulation of expressive
content. New forms of regulation must comply with the Charter, including the rule
of justiﬁcation that an infringement of the Charter must be carefully tailored to avoid
123

Final Report, Canadian Commission on Democratic Expression, “Harms Reduction:
A Six-Step Program to Protect Democratic Expression Online (January 2021), online:
<https://ppforum.ca/articles/harms-reduction-a-six-step-program-to-protect-democraticexpression-online/>.
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 See also A. Karadeglija,
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returns”, October 10, 2021, National Post (explaining government plans to establish a
regulator and to require social media platforms to remove illegal content within 24 hours),
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collateral restrictions on constitutionally protected activity. Reinvigorating the
requirement that regulations must be minimally impairing sends a signal to the
legislatures that measures that do not meet constitutional standard must be
invalidated.
Further adjustments are required to complete an overhaul of the methodology. As
suggested above, the contextual approach should be displaced by proportionality
balancing, which has matured in recent years. In revisiting this step, it is critical to
refresh its purpose, which is to enable the right or freedom to prevail against an
infringement that is otherwise justiﬁable. By deﬁnition, and because it only arises
when a violation passes the other steps of the Oakes test, the goal of ﬁnal
proportionality is rights protection: to determine whether the salutary beneﬁts of
restrictions on expressive freedom outweigh its deleterious consequences for s.
2(b)’s guarantee of a fundamental freedom. This element of the justiﬁcation analysis
cannot be vitalized or re-vitalized without addressing the “naked balancing” that
typiﬁes and problematizes this step.127
A principled application of minimal impairment will minimize reliance on this
element of Oakes, but where it matters and could affect the outcome, proportionality
balancing must place an explicit onus on the government to demonstrate why the
salutary beneﬁts of the violation outweigh the deleterious consequences for
expressive freedom. Section 2(b)’s renewed approach to the question of breach
forms the backdrop of that discussion, ensuring that proportionality balancing does
not replicate or re-introduce the assumptions of the contextual approach and its
disapproval of low-value expression. Under this model, the deleterious consequences of the infringement are directly juxtaposed with its salutary beneﬁts, free
from the a priori value judgments of the contextual approach. In a renewed version
of proportionality balancing, the deleterious consequences of an infringement
cannot be brushed off, but must be squarely and rigorously addressed.
In practice, the proposed methodology will raise the threshold for limits under s.
1, placing the analysis in a framework of principle that is consistent with a robust
conception of freedom under s. 2(b), and a burden of justiﬁcation that falls on the
state under s. 1. There is sufficient opportunity to justify limits on freedom under this
framework because ﬁnal proportionality enables the analytical calculus of beneﬁts
and consequences to be calibrated. Regulatory interests can prevail, even when set
against the deleterious consequences for freedom, where the salutary beneﬁts of
regulation are exigent and well established by the evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 2(b)’s progress thus far has been mixed. The Charter’s guarantee of
127
C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under the
Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform 21 at 40. A more developed
discussion of what this might look like is beyond the scope of this article and its primary
objective of proposing a prospectus for s. 2(b) methodology.
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expressive freedom has generated the most diverse and complex jurisprudence
under s. 2, including on matters relating to the press and media, and has informed
the outcome in cases where s. 2(b) overlaps with other s. 2 guarantees, such as ss.
2(a) and (d). Yet unlike other Charter guarantees, s. 2(b)’s conception of entitlement
and Charter methodology have not been signiﬁcantly refreshed or renewed over the
years, on the breach or justiﬁcation sides of the analysis.128 This is despite the
criticism this jurisprudence has attracted over the years.
A renewal of s. 2(b) should not be piecemeal, but must instead embrace the very
conception of freedom that is protected by the guarantee, as well as the jurisprudential methodology of breach and justiﬁcation. This article offers a starting point
and work in progress on that project. Still early in its development, the proposal
explains the goal, which is a principled foundation or conception of expressive
freedom, and the steps that must be taken to reset the current s. 2(b) methodology.
The model focuses symmetrically on questions of breach and justiﬁcation because
the problems in the current methodology arise under s. 2(b) and s. 1.
The proposal turns the tables on the current jurisprudence and prioritizes the
question of breach, leaving a more detailed discussion of s. 1 for a future article.
Under s. 2(b), developing a principle of freedom, dropping the purpose-effects test,
and replacing it with a new standard of infringement are the ﬁrst steps. Under s. 1,
abandoning the contextual approach and restoring an evidence-based approach to
decision making are the central objectives. The proposed framework of renewal
acknowledges that other issues must still be discussed. Central among them is the
status and wisdom of the assumption that the Oakes framework can serve as a
monolithic standard for diverse s. 2(b) – and Charter – issues. The next step in this
project is to turn the spotlight on s. 1 and offer a more integral approach to the
analysis of justiﬁcation in s. 2(b) cases.
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But see City of Toronto v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2021] S.C.J. No. 34, 2021
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obligations under s. 2(b) of the Charter).
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